Name: Only in the Mind of the Enemy: Can Deterrence Effectiveness be Measured? (en Inglés)
Price: 21.38 USD
Availability: InStock
Author: National Defense University
ISBN: 9781502925268

portada Only in the Mind of the Enemy: Can Deterrence Effectiveness be Measured? (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Autor

National Defense University

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.5 cm

Peso

0.23 kg.

ISBN13

9781502925268

Categorías

Guerra y defensa bélica

Only in the Mind of the Enemy: Can Deterrence Effectiveness be Measured? (en Inglés)

National Defense University (Autor) · Createspace Independent Publishing Platform · Tapa Blanda

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Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "Only in the Mind of the Enemy: Can Deterrence Effectiveness be Measured? (en Inglés)"

Measuring the effectiveness of deterrence activities and messages is challenging since the adversary will not admit to being deterred. This study proposes that planners can use intelligence indicators to provide feedback for measuring deterrence effectiveness. Reviewing the evolution of U.S. deterrence strategy, as well as, current U.S. deterrence strategy provides planners with the desired end states and principles for executing deterrence operations. A search for joint deterrence doctrine disclosed that such doctrine does not exist In the absence of deterrence doctrine, this paper reviewed four historical cases. These cases demonstrate that a multitude of indicators showed deterrence activity effects, yet the U.S. did not always adjust its deterrence strategy to successfully influence the adversary. A review of military deception doctrine and historical deception operations provides guidance for successfully influencing adversary decision makers. Using the military deception operations lessons learned combined with four historical case observations, this study proposes an indicator list that planners can use to develop priority intelligence requirements to measure deterrence effects.